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Abstract
This study aims to identify behavioral spillover effects related to travel mode de-
cisions. In particular the effect of a shift towards environmentally friendly day-to-day
commuting on occasional longer distance travel modes is explored. Therefore a natural
experiment caused by the implementation of congestion charging in Stockholm and
Gothenburg is exploited. In a fixed effects model with a control group, the average
treatment effect on the treated is estimated by regressing the number of short-haul
flight trips on a policy treatment dummy and the amount of the charge, respectively.
The findings reveal predominantly positive estimates, confirmed and strengthened by
various extensions, and thus point towards negative spillover effects.
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1 Introduction
Air transportation currently contributes roughly 3% to global anthropogenic carbon emis-
sions and is likely to increase quickly due to growing demand for air travel and decreasing
returns in fuel efficiency [39]. In order to reduce anthropogenic effects on the climate
and to keep global warming well below 2 degrees compared to pre-industrial levels, 195
nations have signed the COP21 agreement in Paris in 2015. With emission reductions
officially on the agenda of most of these countries, it is important to evaluate the effects
of environmental policies properly to make sure they are more than a drop in the ocean.
This is usually not an easy task. An increasing number of studies show the relevance of
behavioral spillover effects, especially in pro-environmental contexts [45].
Spillover effects can be defined as a change in one behavior, triggered by some change
in a previous behavior. When a policy is implemented, it is likely to not only affect the
targeted behavior, but also to “spill over” to other actions beyond that. These effects
are particularly problematic when they lead to rebound or backfire effects: a net partial
offsetting of the original goal or even adverse effects. A famous example is the widely
discussed Jevon’s Paradox [41]. In order to be able to tackle climate change - and other
environmental problems - efficiently, it is crucial for policy makers to understand the whole
chain of impacts their decisions cause.
Regarding the increasing impact of air travel, the research question of the underlying study
is whether there is evidence for spillover effects in the mobility sector. In particular, the
challenge is to find out if a shift towards environmentally friendly commuting on a local
level affects people’s choice of travel modes for longer distances. This is studied in the
context of a natural experiment in Scandinavia - the scattered implementation of conges-
tion charging.
Exploiting the sudden and noticeable shift of many people from car commuting to pub-
lic transportation triggered by the implementation of inner city congestion charging in
Stockholm and Gothenburg, this study will explore the effects on short-haul air travel. In
a difference-in-differences setting, the development of the number of short-haul flights in
the treated cities is compared to the same outcome variable for a control group of other
Scandinavian cities. These are Malmo¨, Copenhagen, Helsinki and Oslo. To answer the
research question, three sub goals are set up: (a) find evidence for the shift in daily com-
muting behavior in the treated cities, (b) look for causal inference between the number of
flights and congestion charging and (c) use some extensions to see if they alter the results.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the back-
ground of this study, including a literature review, the basic conception of the problem and
a summary of the effects of congestion charging. Section 3 then dives into the method-
ologies which are used to empirically analyze the problem at hand. The results of the
main analysis and several extensions are presented and interpreted in section 4. Section 5
concludes.
2 Background of the Study
2.1 Literature Review
Over the past years, behavioral aspects departing from standard rational choice theory
have gained importance. Shogren & Taylor for instance emphasize the influence of deviat-
ing behavior for environmental economics [40]. Other studies show that policy makers are
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becoming increasingly aware of the results from behavioral research [9, 17, 43]. Following
this development, there is an increasing bulk of literature on so called behavioral spillover
effects. Nilsson et al. define them as: “the effect that an initial behavior has on a subse-
quent behavior or the same behavior in a different time or context” [35].
Spillover effects can work in different directions [16]. They can be promoting, i.e. sequen-
tial behaviors have concordant signs, which often means that individuals have a strong
preference for consistency [1]. Theories supporting this type of spillover effects include
cognitive dissonance theory [4] or foot-in-the-door effects [20] for example. Discordant
directions of sequential behaviors can be permitting or purging. They include effects like
ego depletion [31], moral licensing [5] or moral cleansing [48]. While Cascio & Plant [11]
have found evidence for prospective licensing, this study focusses on the more common
assumption that people use up moral credits they already acquired through earlier behav-
ior. Table 1 gives an overview about the directions of spillover effects.
Table 1: Spillover Effects in Pro-Environmental Behavior
Spillover Type Initial Behavior Subsequent Behavior
Promoting Pro-environmental Pro-environmental positive
(Polluting) (Polluting)
Permitting Pro-environmental Polluting negative
Purging Polluting Pro-environmental negative
Dolan & Galizzi summarize that different kinds of spillovers can be facilitated in different
contexts [16]. They claim that the five main streams of literature related to this focus on
the cost of the initial behavior, the level of completeness of reaching a goal, the (spatial or
temporal) proximity of two sequential behaviors, the trade-off between different motives
and the cognitive mindset during the behaviors.
Particularly interesting to the underlying study are some findings related to costs and
motives of behavior. Studies by Gneezy et al. indicate that permitting spillovers are more
likely than promoting if the cost of the first behavior is low [21]. Other studies find evi-
dence that promoting spillovers are less likely to occur when the first behavior is related
to an external cause [37,47]. According to Dhar & Simonson the type of spillover depends
on the trade-off that is made. They find that trade-offs between motives and resources
facilitate promoting spillovers, compared to trade-offs between different motives, which
promote permitting spillovers [13].
This does not pave the way for expecting any particular outcome in the present study. The
(perceived) cost of shifting towards public transportation becomes lower under congestion
charging, as it becomes relatively cheaper compared to car usage. This would favor a
permitting effect. The fact that a price change provides an external cause for behavioral
changes lowers the probability of promoting spillover effects. The trade-off between mo-
tives (pro-environmental image) and resources (time and money) on the other hand would
fuel expectations about promoting spillovers. Against this background neither positive,
nor negative spillover effects can be excluded a priori.
Most of the previously mentioned results are obtained through qualitative experiments
or surveys. These research methods can be desirable, especially if one is concerned with
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understanding the driving forces in decision making processes. However, their results are
often biased due to the hypothetical nature of some experiments [34] or through survey
effects [16] for instance. If the focus lies on finding reliable empirical evidence, data from
natural experiments can offer an attractive alternative.
Behavioral spillovers have been studied empirically through actual or natural experiments
before. Tiefenbeck et al. study the effect of receiving tips for saving water on households’
water and electricity consumption in a controlled field experiment and find evidence for
moral licensing [44]. Ek & Miliute-Plepiene find policy-driven positive spillover effects
from food-waste collection in Sweden by analysing a natural experiment in a difference-
in-differences approach [18]. Jacobsen et al. empirically strengthen the existence of moral
licensing by showing that certain households increase their electricity consumption upon
a shift to “green electricity” in a green electricity program in Tennessee [30].
While there has been much research on spillover effects, it is hard to find studies con-
necting this phenomenon to the demand of air travel. This might be because flying has
commonly been seen as a desirable behavior aﬄicted with positive social norms, power
and status. However, evidence is accumulating that consumers of air travel are becoming
more aware of the negative environmental impacts of their behavior and even that there
is a growing negative discourse around frequent flying [12].
Another reason for the gap in the literature on spillover effects and travel decisions might
be that pro-environmental behavior and travel mode choices seem to be poorly linked
in general. The low-cost hypothesis, which states that the magnitude of effects of envi-
ronmental concern on pro-environmental behavior diminishes with increasing behavioral
costs [14] supports that. Diekman & Preisendo¨rfer find in a survey in Germany that car
ownership and holiday air travel are only weakly related to environmental attitudes com-
pared to “cheaper” behaviors, such as recycling, water use or shopping. In line with this
are other studies, which show that most people continue holiday air travel despite their
environmental concerns [12, 24, 33]. Whitmarsh & O’Neill even show that people with
stronger pro-environmental attitudes travel more [46].
2.2 Conceptual Framework
The conceptual framework of this study roughly follows a scheme that Dolan & Galizzi [16]
developed for the interpretation of behavioral spillovers. Similarly, there is a skeleton of
three basic pillars, but some of the subordinated assumptions are adjusted. The first cen-
tral assumption is that there are two different behaviors, which take place sequentially,
based on the defintion of spillover effects earlier. Specifically, it is assumed that there is
some intervention targeted at, and changing, the initial behavior.
Does altering Behavior Through Price Changes Count?
While Dolan & Galizzi [16] exclude all behavioral changes based on price mechanisms from
their concept, the initial behavior in the underlying study is altered primarily by a change
in relative prices. Imposing the charge de facto raises the price for car usage. Accord-
ing to the foundations of microeconomic theory, as described by Pindyck & Rubinfeld or
Gravelle & Rees [23, 36], for example, this will increase the slope of the budget line and
lead to shifts in demand patterns. In particular, rational choice theory predicts a decrease
in demand for car travel when its price increases. It is however not as clear what happens
to the consumption of the second good or service; in this case air travel. Depending on
the consumers’ preferences and the use of the charge revenue, its demand might either
increase or decrease. Appendix A visualizes potential income and substitution effects. In
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reality, it is difficult to disentangle these effects, and as mentioned earlier, attention should
be paid to behavioral responses that are not covered by rational choice theory.
One might assume for example that even if people are adjusting their behavior following a
change in relative prices, they might give themselves moral credit for this adaptation. This
can be seen as particularly likely, if an intervention is based on aspects of environmental
improvement, or if the public debate of the intervention is dominated by such effects. In
addition to that, there might even be behavioral spillover effects for those people who
are not adapting their behavior under the policy, because they receive a signal that their
choice is bad.
The Basis for Linking Behaviors
The second pillar of the conceptual frame is that the two sequential behaviors must be
linked by some kind of motive, which is a common driver underlying both actions. Assum-
ing that people are maximizing their utility, the sources of utility need to be considered.
One can argue that in the context of pro-environmental behavior, it is possible to dif-
ferentiate between some form of personal and altruistic utility. People gain some utility
directly from consuming a certain good or service; in this case from the travel mode they
choose. Nevertheless they can receive additional altruistic utility. This can be immediate,
like the often cited warm-glow from charitable giving [3, 29]. Moral credential hypothesis
for example predicts that individuals accumulate positive feelings from taking a moral
decision, in this case choosing environmentally friendly travel modes.
Apart from that, consumers might also consider some kind of long-term utility. This is
particularly relevant for bridging behaviors at different points in time. This paper assumes
that the two most important deeper preferences concern self-perception and external per-
ception. Individuals can either pursue higher-order identities (life goals), or they can try
to create a certain external image of themselves. While superiority of the first goal should
lead to more consistent behavior and hence positive spillover effects, because inconsistent
decisions cause tensions, dominance of the external perception goal is likely to lead to
negative spillovers. That is because the people that surround a person daily might not
ever get to know which long distance travel mode choice that person makes.
How Are Different Behaviors Linked?
The third and last pillar of the conceptual framework concerns how the initial behavior
affects the subsequent behavior. Generally there could be positive, negative or no spillover
effects, depending heavily on the underlying motive. Blanken et al. [5] have found evidence
for the existence of a moral licensing effect, but the literature suggests mixed results about
the direction of spillover effects. The fundamental idea in this paper is that people will
attribute themselves credit for a shift towards more environmentally friendly travel modes
in their day-to-day lives. Hence they could tend to choose more or less environmentally
friendly travel modes for occasional long-distance trips afterwards. As the theory provides
reasonable explanations for both behaviors, the analysis will be performed in a way that
allows for both directions: a two-sided hypothesis test.
2.3 Road Pricing in Scandinavia
The basic assumption for this study is that some initial behavior is changed, which in turn
causes a following behavior to change. This is supposed to happen only for the treatment,
not for the control group. The intitial behavior is the decision about travel modes for
daily commuting, which is equivalent to the direct effect of the congestion charge. Thus
it needs to be made sure that the introduction of the policy actually caused a shift in
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travel mode choices (Sub goal (a)). In particular the shift should have been towards more
environmentally friendly modes than cars (e.g. public transportation or cycling), if the
assumption that people give themselves moral credit for the decision should hold. Once
this is established, the analysis can be taken further to see if there have been any changes
in the subsequent behavior (the number of flight trips).
There are various forms of road pricing, like road tolling, congestion charging, or different
forms of time or distance-based fees. While road tolling for instance usually serves the
purpose of financing infrastructure investments, congestion charging is rather aimed at
improving environmental quality. Globally there are only a handful of cities that have
established congestion charging thus far. Some examples are Singapore in 1975 [22], Lon-
don in 2003 [32], Stockholm in 2006 [6], Milan in 2008 [38] and Gothenburg in 2013 [7].
Bo¨rjesson & Kristoffersson highlight that many other cities, like Edinburgh, Manchester,
New York, or also Helsinki and Copenhagen have discussed the implementation of conges-
tion charging, but have not implemented them in spite of high pollution levels [7].
This study focuses on the congestion charging schemes implemented in Stockholm and
Gothenburg. Both cities have established a time-dependently priced cordon around their
city center to reduce overall traffic pollution, especially during rush hours. Oslo has - as
many other Norwegian cities - had road pricing through a toll ring for quite a long time
(since 1990). The scheme mainly differs from the Swedish congestion charging in that fees
are not time-differentiated, heavy vehicles are charged more and that the fee is only raised
when entering into the city1. It is important to emphasize that the treatment group is
not characterized by having road pricing in place, but rather by having changed travel
behavior through their road pricing policy. The toll system in Oslo for instance is designed
to affect travel behavior as little as possible [19,28]. Table 2 gives an overview about road
pricing in the six cities which are included in the study.
Table 2: Road Pricing in Scandinavia
City Road Pricing Measure Effects on Travel Behavior
Stockholm Time-differentiated cordon around Real traffic reductions of
the inner city (current peak price 35 SEK) up to 31%
Gothenburg Time-differentiated cordon around Traffic reductions around
the inner city (current peak price 22 SEK) 12%
Malmo¨ No road pricing in place -
Copenhagen No road pricing in place, but widely discussed -
Helsinki No road pricing in place, but widely discussed -
Oslo Evenly priced toll belt around the city centre Potentially minor traffic reductions2
Before implementing a permanent congestion charging scheme, Stockholm went through a
trial phase from January 3 until July 31 2006. Parallel to that, an extension of the public
1The heavy vehicle category includes vehicles with a weight of more than 3,500kg. More information
can be found under http://www.autopass.no/en/autopass
2As the toll ring in Oslo was designed in a way that affects travel behavior as little as possible, there
are no detailed studies about behavioral changes. Some studies claim to find a slight increase or decrease
in car usage, but the results are minor and mixed.
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transportation network took place between August 31 2005 and December 31 2006. After
a referendum in 2007, the charges were implemented permanently in August 2007. Prices
have been phased between zero (e.g. at night) and 20SEK during peak hours. The peak
charge was raised to 35SEK in 2016. The charging zone has around 300,000 inhabitants,
but many people from outside this zone are affected by the charge as well. More than
210,000 people commute into Stockholm’s charging zone to work and around 60,000 com-
mute out of the zone for the same purpose [19].
Gothenburg introduced congestion charging on January 1 2013 without a trial phase and
against the general public opinion [2]. Similar to Stockholm, crossing a cordon around
the inner city is charged. The rates vary according to the time of the day as well and
originally ranged between zero and 18SEK. In 2015 the peak charge was raised to 22SEK.
More important than technical details of the charges are the effects on travel behavior
for the purpose of this study. The most important effects are summarized in the last
column of table 2. During the trial phase in Stockholm, traffic volumes across the cordon
decreased by 22% compared to the previous year’s values according to Eliasson et al. [19],
who evaluate travel time measurements and traffic flows before and during the trial. They
also highlight that based on travel surveys most commuters, who changed their behavior
probably switched from private cars to public transportation, resulting in an increase of
6% in public transportation trips. Bo¨rjesson et al. claim that only 1% of the commuters
adapted by changing the route to work or school [6]. Discretionary trips across the cordon
decreased as well, but the trend there has been more towards reduced trip frequency or
alternative routes.
These trends continued in Stockholm when the charges were introduced permanently. In
the first four years after the permanent introduction of the charge, traffic volumes across
the cordon decreased by between 18 and 20% compared to 2005. When adjusting for other
impacts, such as inflation, exemptions or fuel prices, the reductions between 2006 and 2011
were even around 27 to 31% [6]. What is interesting is that even between the trial and
the final implementation of the charges in 2006/2007, the traffic volume was about 5 to
10% lower than in 2005. Bo¨rjesson et al. offer transaction costs as potential explanation.
However, trying out alternative travel modes might have also convinced some people that
they are better and thus represent a voluntary shift.
While the traffic reductions in Stockholm stabilized about one month after the first intro-
duction of the charge, the adaptation process seems to have been slower in Gothenburg.
Bo¨rjesson & Kristoffersson report that after eight months, the traffic reductions main-
tained at a magnitude of 12% across the cordon in Gothenburg [7]. The reduction in the
city center that can be accounted to the congestion charge was around 3 to 5 %. Andersson
& Na¨sse´n find an average reduction of 10% in traffic volume during the first year [2]. As
in Stockholm, commuters in Gothenburg switched to public transport, while discretionary
travellers reduced their trip frequency or switched to alternative routes [7]. These authors
also claim that the increase in public transportation usage due to congestion charging can
be estimated to be between 4.5 and 6.5%.
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3 Methodology
3.1 Choice of Treatment and Control Group
As the behavioral shift in this study is primarily caused by a price change, not some moral
conviction, it is important to have reason to assume that people give themselves moral
credit for their behavior anyhow. This is generally hard to tell from the aggregated data
that is used for this study. In Stockholm, however, studies have shown that the citizens felt
improved air quality [19] and that the support for the charge was closely related to environ-
mental attitudes [6]. People’s attitudes towards the charging have improved tremendously
and there was high compliance with and few complaints about the new regulation once it
was in place. Thus it seems reasonable that people would assume their behavior adds to
improved environmental goals.
The situation in Gothenburg is slightly more difficult. While the city has tried to mar-
ket congestion charging as an environmental policy, the primary reason for the charge
was obviously the financing of infrastructure projects. This led to low public support
for the charge and most likely does not make the affected people feel like acting pro-
environmentally. Andersson & Na¨sse´n for instance find that people who have not changed
their travel behavior and those who have do not differ in their level of environmental
concern [2]. Hence it is more likely that citizens of Gothenburg did not give themselves
as much moral credit for complying with the new regulation. Gothenburg is thus a ”less
credible” treated entity than Stockholm and it might be wise to include an extension of
the study without Gothenburg.
While there is a starting point now to assume that the treatment group experienced a
change in behavior they might give themselves credit for, it is just as important to make
sure the control group did not experience this. Road pricing is very common in Norway,
but it is primarily used to finance infrastructure investments. Indeed the revenues from
the toll ring in Oslo contributed somewhat to public transportation, but the scheme was
introduced mainly to finance road enlargements and its stated purpose was to have as
little traffic consequences as possible. Thus Oslo’s toll ring should not be seen as an envi-
ronmental measure, but rather a pure financing tool.
As mentioned above, congestion charging has also been discussed intensely in Helsinki
and Copenhagen. This is really interesting, because their “almost implementation” the-
oretically makes them a very good control group over and above their size and spatial
proximity to the treated cities. As far as I know the city of Malmo¨ has not considered
congestion charging or a similar policy thus far. It should still be included in the control
group as it is the biggest Swedish city without a congestion charging scheme.
3.2 Choice of Method
This section tries to examine if there is a causal relationship between the policy introduc-
tion and short-haul flight demand. Mathematically speaking, it is the average treatment
effect on the treated (ATET) which needs to be identified. The ATET, as the name sug-
gests, is the expected effect of a treatment on some outcome variable as compared to the
outcome had the unit not been treated:
E[Yi1 − Yi0|Ti = 1]
Yi1 represents the outcome variable, the number of short-haul flights per capita, in city i
if this city implemented congestion charging. Yi0 stands for the same outcome had city i
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not implemented this policy. The expected difference between those two outcomes should
be conditional on that the city has actually been treated (Ti = 1).
It becomes obvious that the fundamental problem in this kind of estimation is that it is
impossible to observe both of the two outcomes for one entity. Basically this means that
before estimating the ATET, one needs to use the control group to estimate the outcome
had a treated city not been treated, Yi0. Therefor a standard fixed effects model, which
is explained in more detail below, is used.
The simplest version of a fixed effect model is a difference-in-difference (DID) analysis.
DID measures the difference in the change of the outcome variable over time for the
treatment and the control group. The core of the method is to assume that the treated
units would have developed in the same way as the control group, if they had not received
the treatment. Essentially that requires both groups to have parallel trends in the outcome
variable before the treatment. Figure 1 gives an overview of the long-term flight trends
for the treatment and control group.
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Red lines indicate introduction dates of congestion charge 2006 (trial) and 2007
(permanent) in Stockholm and 2013 in Gothenburg
Figure 1: Average Yearly Number of Flight Trips
The dependent variable used in this study is the number of carried passengers from or to
a city’s airports (black lines). As becomes clear from the graph, those values are mostly
unavailable during earlier years. Helsinki and Oslo report carried passenger numbers since
1997 and 2002, respectively. For all other cities, data is only available from 2004. Unfor-
tunately, this leaves only two pre-treatment periods for Stockholm. Therefore the trend of
another variable, which moves extremely similar to the carried passengers, but is available
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for earlier years as well shall be considered: on board passengers (light grey lines)3.
Apart from very small departures, the values for carried passengers move very similarly
across the two groups (the black lines). The same holds for the average number of on
board passengers (the grey lines)4. Generally the average number of flight trips is much
higher in the control group than in the treatment group. That is probably largely driven
by the very high number of trips per capita from and to Oslo. Although the average val-
ues are quite different in absolute terms, the groups show parallel trends throughout the
observed period. The three vertical lines show the introduction of the congestion charge
policy (treatment), 2006/2007 in Stockholm (first as a trial and then permanently) and
2013 in Gothenburg.
Theoretically, one would expect a disruption in the trend for the treatment group once
they receive the treatment5. However, as congestion charging cannot be expected to have
more than a marginal impact on air travel demand, especially compared to other factors,
such as income for instance, it is not surprising that there are no strong blips or anything
similar visible in this graph. Another problem that might weaken the graphical effect of
the charge are the dissimilar introduction dates. One might be able to see a stronger effect
if Stockholm and Gothenburg had introduced the charge at the same time.
Yet looking at the graph closely reveals some potential effects. There are irregular devi-
ations from the common trend in the treated group between 2006 and 2008, right after
the introduction of the Stockholm congestion charges. While the control group average
continues an upwards trend, flight numbers in the treated group decline. Nevertheless, it
is hard to tell if there is any effect after Gothenburg introduced its charging policy from
this graph.
Observing potential effects when plotting the data of course does not allow for any causal
inference. A more detailed analysis controlling for further variables is needed in order to
draw any conclusions. After making sure that the parallel trend assumption holds, the
analysis can be stepped up and moved on to the econometric model. The rest of section
3 explains the theoretical basis of the econometric methods, which are used to analyse
the research question. It also discusses the decision making process regarding control
variables, data and modeling.
3.3 The Fixed Effects Model
3.3.1 Introduction to Fixed Effects
The relationship between the implementation of a congestion charge and the number of
flight-trips is estimated using a difference-in-differences (DID) approach. The ”problem”
with DID is that it only includes two time periods. If panel data is available for more than
two periods, as is the case in this study, it is possible to extend this approach by using so
called fixed effects models.
A fixed effect model is a multi-period extension of the DID model and a type of multiple
regression model. It exploits panel data by controlling for variables that vary either over
3On board passengers are not suitable to be our dependent variable, because they include direct transit
passengers. Those passengers arrive at one airport for a stop and leave it on the same plane. Hence they
should not be affected by the policy at all. Still, those two variables move together closely, whenever they
are both available. So for comparing long-term trends before the policy, it can be useful to consider them
both. Appendix B provides a more detailed overview of these numbers for each city separately.
4Be aware that the two grey lines and the two black lines are supposed to be parallel.
5Appendix C illustrates the optimal difference-in-difference effect in theory.
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time, or across entities. These variables are usually unobserved and thus hard to include
in other settings. If these kind of unobserved variables exist, using a fixed effects model
will reduce potential omitted variable bias. In the context of this thesis the question is
whether there are city or time-specific variables, which determine the number of short-haul
flights (Y). It is reasonable to assume that the cities in the sample have some very specific
endemic characteristics that influence the number of flight trips per capita. These could
be cultural attitudes towards flying, natural barriers like topographic conditions or sheer
spatial distance to other economic centres for instance. Putting up a model with only city
fixed effects could look as follows.
Yit = β0 + β1Tit + β2Zi + uit
In the study at hand, the dependent variable Yit is the number of short-haul flights to and
from one city per capita of the regional population. The independent variable Tit would
be a treatment dummy equal to 1 if congestion charging is in place in city i at time t and
zero otherwise. Zi represents an unobserved city characteristic, say the topography of the
region, which is inherent to that city alone and does not (quickly) change over time. Then
each of the six cities will have a particular intercept αi = β0 + β2Zi, the city fixed effect.
The slope of the regression line β1 will be the same for all of them. Analogously, one can
set up a regression model including only time fixed effects:
Yit = β0 + β1Tit + β3St + uit
This will lead to year specific intersects λt = β0 + β3St. St might include fuel price
developments or an increased global integration that leads to more flight trips across all
the cities. The possibility to control for fixed effects is a really nice feature. However,
there might be further (un)observable variables that change both, over time and across
entities. If these are determinants of Y and related to the treatment, they will lead
to a biased estimator. One example could be the gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita. It differs between the cities, but it also changes over time. It is very likely
to determine the demand for flight trips and could potentially be related to congestion
charging through car ownership or willingness to pay for environmental externalities.
The basic fixed effects model is not able to control for these kinds of confounders, so they
have to be included as additional regressors. Making sure omitted variable bias is avoided
whenever possible, both city and year fixed effects, as well as further confounders will be
included in the analysis. This leads to the following model specification:
Yit = β1Tit + δjXj + αi + λt + uit
Where Xj stands for a number J of confounding variables, i.e. j = 1, ..., J . As suggested
above those could be regional per capita income, but also air fares, tourism indicators or
many other factors that change over time and between the different entities. The exact
choice of control variables is discussed in detail and presented in tabular form in section
3.4.
3.3.2 The Model Assumptions
The fixed effects regression assumptions are basically an extension of the ordinary least
squares assumptions from cross-sectional to panel data. The first assumption (A1) is that
the conditional distribution of the error term uit, given all confounders, has a mean of zero.
Basically this means that the treatment Tit and the error term uit may not be correlated.
What is particularly important for panel data is that uit cannot be correlated to either past,
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present or future Tit. In theory random treatment assignment ensures that A1 holds.
The second assumption (A2) states that all regressors must be i.i.d. - identically and
independently distributed. If the variables are drawn from the same population, they
are necessarily identically distributed. Moreover random sampling ensures independent
distribution. When analysing panel data the regressors only need to be independent
between the various entities. They may be - and usually are - correlated over time within
one entity.
Assumption 3 (A3) demands that there are no large outliers in the data for any of the
regressors. Mathematically said, they all have nonzero finite moments: 0 < Yit < ∞,
0 < Tit < ∞ and 0 < Xj < ∞. A3 is needed because OLS estimators can be responsive
to these deviations outside the regular data range.
The fourth and last assumption (A4) states that there must not be multicollinearity among
the regressors. In other words, none of them can be a perfect linear function of another
one. While A3 and A4 have their raison d’eˆtre, A1 and A2 are usually seen as the more
important assumptions. For the present study it should be kept in mind that random
treatment assignment is essential for fulfilling the assumptions of the model.
3.3.3 Threats to Internal Validity
Estimates are said to be internally valid if they are consistent and unbiased. However,
there are several threats to the internal validity of empirical studies. The four potentially
most relevant problems to this study shall be discussed briefly: Omitted variable bias,
measurement error, missing data & sample selection as well as simultaneous causality. All
these cases can lead to bias through correlation between T and u and thus violate A1.
As discussed above omitted variable bias (OVB) emerges when important control variables
are left out of the regression model. I.e. variables which are correlated with one or more
regressors and affect the outcome of interest. If data for these variables is available, they
can be included in the model as additional regressors. Yet, the choice of control variables
is not always as simple as it may seem. It is usually a trade-off between bias and variance
and not all the desired data might be available. To address this problem several control
variables are included in this study. However, it will become clear that it is not possible
to control for all the desired variables. This should be kept in mind for the interpretation
of the results.
Measurement error can stem from wrong values for the dependent variable (Y), or the
independent variable (Classical Measurement Error). Depending on the character of the
measurement error, inaccuracies in the independent variable can lead to so called errors-
in-variables bias. Errors in variables can result from wrong answers in surveys or typo-
graphical errors when administrative data is entered, for example. If there is measurement
error in Y, the variance increases, but no bias is introduced. To ensure best data quality
most data for this study stems from reliable official sources, such as Eurostat or national
authorities.
Similarly to the measurement error, missing data only causes problems depending on why
the data is missing. Stock & Watson [42] discuss three different possibilities. If data
is missing independent of the values of Y, this merely reduces the sample size without
introducing bias. This holds if data is missing completely at random or dependent on a
regressor (which is sometimes the case in this study). However, if data is missing depend-
ing on the outcome variable, sample selection bias will be introduced. This should not be
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a problem in the present study, because the choice of cities was not dependent on their
outcome variable (number of flights), and no city had to be discarded because of that.
Last but not least there is simultaneous causality. It basically occurs if the outcome vari-
able can be suspected to determine the independent variable. This is an apparent problem
in the present study. While the effect of a congestion charge on the number of flight trips
per person is being studied, it is quite likely that more flight trips could be the cause for
bad air quality and thus the introduction of a congestion charge in the first place. Unfor-
tunately the possible solutions to this type of bias are randomized controlled experiments
or instrumental variable regression, both of which are almost impossible to perform in
this case. Another potential solution could be the use of lagged variables, which will be
abstained from due to the limited amount of available data. Matching is used to come as
close as possible to randomization, but this problem should be kept in mind when inter-
preting the results of the study.
Another issue for internal validity are inconsistent standard errors, as they can produce
bias as well. Standard errors in the particular context of this study are thus discussed in
brief in the following section.
3.3.4 Standard Errors
As mentioned earlier, most of the confounders in panel datasets are correlated over time
within one entity. This arises from the fact that data is collected from the exact same
entity again and again. This kind of correlation is called serial or auto-correlation. It also
means that the error term uit will be correlated over time. Serial correlation affects the
variance of the estimator and thus the standard error. As the regular robust standard
errors do not allow for serial correlation, they are not suitable for panel data analysis.
They lead to downwards-biased standard errors and thus can cause ”overrejection” of the
null hypothesis. I.e. our estimates will be overly confident. Therefore another class of
standard errors, called heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard
errors, needs to be applied. One type of HAC standard errors that is widely used are
clustered standard errors. Those standard errors allow for autocorrelation within clusters
(here cities).
Another problem related to standard errors arises from the underlying study. Fixed effects
models are often used for samples where the number of entities (n) is large. In this case,
however, the sample consists of six entities at maximum. Thus, even the clustered standard
errors need to be corrected theoretically. Cameron et al. suggest wild cluster bootstrapped
errors as a possible solution [10]. Those are hard to combine with the weights from the
matching process, however. Hence it should be kept in mind that the significance of the
results might be too confident.
3.4 Control Variables
3.4.1 About Control Variables
As discussed before, there might be variables that change both across entities and over
time. Those are the ones that need to be included into the model as additional regressors.
However, more is not always better when it comes to control variables. Including more
regressors is always a trade-off.
If they are actual determinants of Y, additional confounders decrease the bias of the
main estimator, but they will also increase the variance of the other estimators. This is
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particularly problematic when the sample size is as small as in the underlying example.
Another problem are so called “bad control variables”. Angrist & Pischke [Angrist and
Pischke, 2008] for example highlight that variables, which are potential outcomes of the
independent variable itself should not be included as controls, because the comparison of
outcome variables conditional on a bad control does not have a causal interpretation.
Stock & Watson [42] suggest 4 steps to decide on whether a control variable should be
included. The first step is to identify the key coefficient of interest, that is the effect
we are trying to explain (here the effect of the congestion charge). Second, the base
regression and potential extensions need to be defined. This should be an a priori choice
based on economic theory rather than outcome-oriented. The base specification should
include few control variables, which are expected to have the most significant impact on the
outcome variable. A list of more ambiguous control variables should be added for potential
extensions. In the third step, the questionable control variables should be included and
tested. Stock & Watson [Ibid.] recommend to keep the regressors if their estimates are
statistically significant or change the main estimator (β1) considerably. Finally all results
should be summarized and made available for a transparent decision making process. The
table with the main regression for all specifications can be found in the appendix C.
3.4.2 Potential Regressors
The variables which might be relevant controls in the underlying model are those that
affect the number of flight trips, are correlated to the introduction of congestion charging
and vary over time and across entities. Table 3 gives an overview about all variables used
in the main analysis.
Table 3: Variables Used in the Fixed Effects Regression
Variable Description Source
Number of Flight Trips Main dependent variable Eurostat
The number of carried passengers (domestically and on
close international flights)6 per capita of the NUTS2 region
Binary Policy Variable Main independent variable Official
Treatment dummy equal to one if at any time during a policy
year congestion charging was in place introduction
GDP The gross domestic product per capita of the metropolitan Eurostat/
region in purchasing power parity Statistics
Norway
Air Fare Index A country specific price index for air travel (Base year 2015) Eurostat
Tourism The total number of nights residents and non-residents Eurostat
spent at tourist accomodation establishments in the NUTS2
region per 1,000 inhabitants of the region
Rail Fare Index A country specific price index for rail travel (Base year 2015) Eurostat
Road Fare Index A country specific price index for road travel (Base year 2015) Eurostat
6Appendix D provides an overview of the close international destinations
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The three most important ones - GDP, air fares and tourism - will enter the base speci-
fication. In accordance with the assumption about the importance of GDP, Brons et al.
claim that there is a strong correlation between income and demand for air travel [8].
This is also in line with the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis, according to
which higher per capita income is likely to be associated with a larger willingness to pay
to prevent pollution and a more positive attitude towards pollution pricing [15].
Secondly, air fares are relevant as the demand for fight trips should depend primarily on
its price, according to economic theory. Higher air fares can be expected to have a nega-
tive impact on the demand for air travel, and vice versa. Additionally, air fares might be
related to congestion charging through other environmental policies for instance.
The third variable, which is the number of tourists, should naturally determine the num-
ber of flight trips in a region, too. Even though the exact interrelation is not obvious,
tourism could easily be related to congestion charging. A city with many leisure tourists
for example might have a special interest in keeping a recreative atmosphere - including
good air quality.
There are a number of other factors which might be suspected to cause omitted variable
bias, however in a more indirect or uncertain way. Two of them are road and rail fares.
While the demand for a good or service is usually affected by its price, the price and avail-
ability of potential substitutes play a major role in consumption decisions, too. In the case
of short-haul flight trips, the closest substitutes might be train travel, car or bus trips.
Thus the price indices of road and rail travel shall be tested as potential control variables.
This is far from optimal, of course, inter alia because these indices are not available per
city, but on the national level. However, this is the best option available.
There are several other variables which were tested, but discarded from the analysis. Those
are unemployment, political composition of local governments and air quality. Appendix E
shows the base regression including the first two variables. Air quality has large potential
to be a ”bad control variable” and is hence included into the analysis during the another
step (the matching process), instead of serving as a control variable. The functions and
application of matching are explained further in the following section.
3.5 Matching
3.5.1 Functions of Matching
Some general problems naturally occur when using quasi-experiments. As mentioned
above, each entity can only be observed in one state: treated or untreated. Hence one
outcome needs to be estimated by comparing treatment and control group. In planned
experiments, random sampling assures that both groups are the same on average. How-
ever, performing randomized experiments is expensive, time-consuming and especially
within the social sciences often ethically questionable. Thus it is much more common to
use observational data from quasi-experimental settings and treat them “as if” random.
However, natural experiments are usually not really “as if” random. In this study, for
example, the introduction of congestion charging likely depends on various observable and
unobservable variables. Fortunately there are some helpful econometric techniques. This
section introduces matching to bring the treatment assignment in the underlying natural
experiment as close to randomization as possible.
Iacus et al. define matching as a “nonparametric method of controlling for the confounding
influence of pretreatment control variables in observational data” [27]. Put differently, the
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idea is to pick and match those treated and control units, which are most similar before
the treatment. So whereas regression models estimate the causal effect of a treatment on
some outcome, matching does not produce any statistical estimators, but is merely a data
pre-processing algorithm.
Controlling for every observable variable that might influence treatment reception will
avoid or reduce correlation between the treatment dummy and the error term. Optimally
each of these confounders would be exactly the same for a treated and a control unit (exact
balance). Under this condition it would be possible to assume that treatment assignment
is basically random. Matching compares those units whose empirical distributions of co-
variates are as similar as possible - or in practice as similar as necessary.
In general, the data can be exactly or approximately balanced. Exact balance is optimal
and might be achievable, if most of the confounders are binary variables and the sample is
very large. To reach exact balancing some of the cities within our sample had to be exactly
equal in terms of GDP per capita, air pollution and many other potential confounders.
This is highly unlikely. If the data are approximately balanced, further control for covari-
ates is necessary after the matching in order to account for the remaining imbalance. This
is done in the fixed effects model.
There are three main contributions of matching to this study. First it possesses the ability
to reduce model dependence and statistical bias, even under approximate balancing [25].
Second it allows to at least partly control for variables which have to be discarded from
the fixed effects model because they are subject to reverse causality or not available in
panel form, for instance. Third matching allows moving closer towards “as if” random
treatment assignment and thus fulfilling the assumptions of the fixed effects model.
There are various forms of matching, all of which are aiming for better balance between
treatment and control group by eliminating mismatched units. One relatively new class
of matching methods, “Monotonic Imbalance Bounding” (MIB) was introduced by Iacus
et al. [26]. These methods actually guarantee that the imbalance will not be larger than
specified ex ante. In contrast to that most common matching methods, such as propensity
score or Mahalanobis matching, belong to a class of methods called equal percent bias
reduction (EPBR), where some matched sample size is assured. Whereas these methods
theoretically reduce imbalance on average, in practice they often increase balance only
for certain covariates, while reducing it for others. As an MIB method ”Coarsened Ex-
act Matching” (CEM) allows the researcher to specify the degree of imbalance ex ante
and the different balancing choices for various variables do not affect each other, thus
addressing issues of bias, rather than variance. It possesses further properties that other
methods fulfill only partly, like meeting the congruence principle (data space & analysis
space), demonstrably reducing model dependence, computational efficiency, etc. These
advantages are the reason why CEM is the preferred method in this study.
3.5.2 Coarsened Exact Matching
As mentioned above, CEM allows the researcher to coarsen the data into reasonable strata
and then match the most similar entities. Thus it is possible to determine the desired
balance between the groups ex-ante. The CEM process itself consists of three main steps:
(i) coarsening the variables, (ii) applying an exact matching algorithm to prune unmatched
units and (iii) discarding the coarsened data. It can be performed in STATA using the
cem command. Only one pre-treatment period is needed for the matching.
As the underlying panel data is available for more than one period before the treatment,
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one pre-treatment year needs to be picked. After having made this decision, the researcher
needs to define the confounders she wants to use, as well as the ranges for each strata for
each variable. This step involves many subjective decisions and will be discussed in more
detail below. In the second step the algorithm will then perform exact matching on the
coarsened data. I.e. those units that fall into the same bins, or land in the same strata
for all confounders, will be matched. It is possible that more than one control unit and
one treated unit fall into the same bin. Thus cem assigns weights to the entities:
wi =
{
1, iǫT s
mC
mT
ms
T
ms
C
, iǫCs
mC and mT stand for the overall number of matched control and treated units and m
s
T
and msC for the number of matched entities within strata sǫS. Each treated unit can be
matched with one or more control entities. Thus a weight of one is assigned to each treated
city, while the weight for the matched control units depends on the number of matches.
Those cities that cannot be matched are assigned zero weight. After the weights have
been assigned, all unmatched units can be removed from the sample. The third and last
step is then to drop the coarsened data and use the original (precise) numbers for further
analysis.
In order to obtain causal inference further regressions are necessary. In the case of this
study the same fixed effects model that is used on the full sample will be employed to
the matched sample. The following section will discuss the manifold choices that must be
made in order to perform the matching in this study.
3.5.3 Matching Choices
In the underlying study there are basically three main questions that need to be answered
before matching can be performed: (i) Which pre-treatment year should be used? (ii)
Which confounders should be included in the matching process? (iii) What range should
each strata have?
The first treatment with the congestion charge started in Stockholm in 2006. Data on
most of the confounders that should be included is available for at least two years before
that. So rather than limiting the analysis by choosing one pre-treatment year, it is possible
to match the cities separately for each pre-treatment year where the panel is more or less
balanced: 2003, 2004 and 2005. This will indicate the level of robustness of the chosen
strata ranges.
The second and third decision concern the choice of confounders and their strata to make
sure the cities that are matched resemble each other in the most important determinants of
congestion charging. Table 4 gives an overview of the five matching confounders described
in this section.
It is reasonable to assume that air quality is a crucial determinant when it comes to the
decision, if congestion charging should be introduced. Thus we will include long-term air
pollution and short-term air pollution as confounders. The first will be measured as the
average annual particulate matter 10 (PM10) concentration and the latter as the number
of days per year that PM10 exceeds a threshold value of 50µg/m3. The assumption is
that lower air quality will increase people’s willingness to introduce pollution pricing.
Short-term air quality, measured in the number of days where the 24 hour mean exceeded
50µg/m3 will be divided into three groups: low short-term pollution (<5 days), medium
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short-term pollution (5 - 15 days) and high short-term pollution (>15 days). Long-term
PM10 pollution will have only one break at 20µg/m3, which is the threshold value given
by the World Health Organization [WHO, 2005]7.
Table 4: Matching Confounders
Variable Description (Range) Source
Long-term Air Quality Average annual concentration of particulate matter Eurostat
of 10 microns in a diameter of air or smaller (PM10)
in µg/m3
(<5, 5-15, >15)
Short-term Air Quality Number of days per year where PM10 concentration Eurostat
exceeds a threshold value
(<50µg/m3, >50µg/m3)
Car Commuters Share of journeys to work by car in % Eurostat
(<25, 25-40, >40)
Public Transportation Commuters Share of journeys to work by public transport (rail, Eurostat
metro, bus, tram) in %
(<25, 25-40, >40)
Commuter Share Share of people commuting into or out of the city in % Eurostat
(<20, >20)
The extent to which people are affected by a congestion charge will always depend crucially
on their travel behavior (car ownerhship, commuting across the cordon, availability of
public transport, etc.). Thus some available indicators from Eurostat’s urban transport
indicators from before the charge introduction will be included. In particular information
on the share of journeys to work by car and public transport, respectively, and the share
of people commuting into or out of the city. This data is not available as a panel, but
rather represents a cross section at some point in time.8
While it would not be possible to include this cross-sectional data in the regular fixed
effects regression, using CEM allows to control for these additional variables by including
them as a pre-treatment characteristic in the matching process. The share of people taking
the car to work and those that take public transportation are divided into a low, medium,
high scheme. The breaks are at 25% and 40%. The commuter share is only divided into
two groups. That is because in general more commuters means that the policy affects more
people. Here it will be assumed that the share of commuters will affect a considerable
amount of people and hence public and political will when it exceeds 20%.
When matched on this basis, the pairs Stockholm and Helsinki as well as Gothenburg
and Copenhagen are matched in 2005. Stockholm and Helsinki are also matched based
on their 2003 and 2004 values, but no other cities. If we look at it closely, Gothenburg
and Copenhagen almost match in 2003 and 2004 as well, often just being slightly left or
7Available from:
http : //apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/69477/1/WHOSDEPHEOEH06.02eng.pdf (17/05/2017)
8As cities do not provide yearly data on these variables, but rather occasional cross-sectional surveys,
data from one city in 2003 are sometimes compared with the same variable for another city from 2004 or
2005.
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right from a threshold value. So in general, based on the criteria above, these cities show
a high resemblance. For that reason 2005 will be used as the pre-treatment situation for
the main regressions. As there will be an extension of the study excluding Gothenburg,
the regression results for that part will be similar to the results we would have gotten had
the matching been based on 2003 or 2004.
4 Data
The main dependent variable is the number of short-haul flight trips per capita within
one year. Short-haul flights include all domestic flights, as well as the specified interna-
tional connections in appendix D. The choice of destinations was limited according to data
availability. Airports located within a range of 150 km from the city centre are considered
as belonging to that particular city.9 The data for flight numbers as well as population
data are taken from Eurostat. To obtain the per capita flight trips per year the sum
of domestic and “close international” flights is divided by the number of inhabitants of
the relevant NUTS2 region10. The earliest flight data is available for Helsinki from 1997.
However, most cities started reporting carried passenger numbers later on, so the panel is
only balanced between 2004 and 2015. Eurostat also provides monthly flight data, which
is used later on as an extension of the model to the main holiday seasons.
The data for the control variables mostly stems from Eurostat as well. GDP per capita
is given in purchasing power standard for the metropolitan region. Metropolitan region
follows Eurostat’s own definition of a city and its commuter belt11. The numbers for Oslo
were not available at Eurostat and are thus taken from Statistics Norway. Tourism is mea-
sured as the number of overnight stays in the NUTS2 region per 1,000 inhabitants. Air, rail
and road fares are country specific average annual indices from Eurostat’s Classification
of individual consumption by purpose (COICOP) dataset. It is adapted to the compi-
lation of the harmonized consumer price index (HICP) of the European Union (EU).
The data sources for the ”unused” control variables should be mentioned as well. Un-
employment is measured as the total unemployment rate of over 15 year-olds for each
metropolitan region. It is obtained from Eurostat and Statistics Denmark. The share of
seats of the green party is given for the municipal councils of each city and is taken from
the national statistical databases of Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway. The two
different air quality measures are the annual average concentration of particulate matter
of 10 microns in a diameter of air or smaller (PM10) in µg/m3 and the number of days per
year where PM10 concentration exceeds a threshold value of 50µg/m3. These numbers
are taken from Eurostat as well.
5 Results
5.1 Effects of Congestion Charging
First of all the number of short-haul flights per capita is regressed on the policy treatment
dummy. Table 5 presents the results of these regressions for the full sample as well as
9This is with the exception of Malmo¨ and Copenhagen. For both cities only their own airports are
counted.
10More information on Eurostat’s division of NUTS regions can be found under the following link http :
//ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/overview
11http : //ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/metropolitan− regions/overview
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for the coarsened exact matched sample. Recall that this sample compares Stockholm
with Helsinki and Gothenburg with Copenhagen. First of all it is apparent that none
Table 5: Main Regression Results
Full Sample CEM
VARIABLES Only FE Base Model Extended Model Only FE Base Model Extended Model
Congestion charge -0.203 0.0585 0.389 0.0629 0.196 0.191
(0.377) (0.208) (0.229) (0.264) (0.156) (0.0955)
GDP 3.78e-05 1.01e-05 2.63e-05 2.40e-05
(2.77e-05) (4.95e-05) (3.52e-05) (3.76e-05)
Air Fare Index 0.00146 0.0153 0.000305 0.000132
(0.00893) (0.0105) (0.00825) (0.00867)
Tourism -0.000210 -0.000457 0.000205 0.000296
(0.000387) (0.000384) (0.000312) (0.000268)
Rail Fare Index 0.0743 -0.00154
(0.0490) (0.0169)
Road Fare Index -0.101 0.0233
(0.0508) (0.0266)
Constant 2.361*** 2.905 4.085 1.513*** 1.757** -0.0899
(0.0322) (1.541) (2.842) (0.0623) (0.537) (1.759)
Observations 81 60 60 55 41 41
R-squared 0.532 0.460 0.621 0.853 0.750 0.753
Number of entity 6 6 6 4 4 4
Entity FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-squared 0.386 0.260 0.454 0.773 0.616 0.589
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
of the results is significant on the 10% level or better. While the estimation in the first
column gives a negative estimate, including more control variables increases the estimate
and turns it positive. The CEM results are positive throughout and change less over the
different specifications. While the estimates obtained from the full sample are actually
quite high (at least the one from the extended model), the CEM estimates, which basically
control for more variables, are lower. They seem to be more stable as well, having smaller
standard errors than the full sample.
These first results do not indicate any causal relationship between congestion charging
and the number of flight trips. Theoretically however, a positive estimate would indicate
an increase in the number of flights following the implementation of a congestion charge.
Neglecting other effects, this would point towards a permitting spillover effect, such as
moral licensing for instance. In contrast to that, negative estimates would represent a
consistent behavior and thus promoting spillover effects.
To test the robustness of these results and paint a somewhat clearer picture, several vari-
ations are performed as well. These are (i) using the peak charge price as an independent
variable (instead of a dummy), (ii) discarding the ”close international” flights and using
domestic flights only, (iii) using only the holiday seasons and (iv) discarding Gothenburg.
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5.2 Extensions
5.2.1 The Peak Charge
Apart from the fact whether congestion charging is in place or not, the actual amount
of the charge could be crucial in determining spillover effects. This could either be due
to differing psychological effects that the price might have on the consumers, or due to
plain income effects. As including the peak charge as a control variable is likely to lead to
multicollinearity, it is used instead as an alternative independent variable. In particular, it
is the price that drivers need to pay when crossing the cordon during the most expensive
hours of the day. Running the same regressions with the peak charge basically yields the
same results as in the main regression, with estimates that are about the twentieth part
of the original estimates. That is rather straightforward, because the peak charges are
roughly around 20SEK. So while these estimates do not give any additional insights, they
are still displayed in appendix F. For the following extensions only the treatment dummy
is used as the independent variable.
5.2.2 Domestic Flights
The second extension concerns the dependent variable, the flight trips. While some in-
ternational connections are within very short distance, one can expect that on average
domestic destinations are closer. For various reasons they might also be easier to substi-
tute with train or road travel. Some reasons could be better connections within the net of
one operator, language barriers or that people are more comfortable driving in their home
country than abroad. While these assumptions are not proved, they give an incentive to
check whether the use of domestic flights only alters the estimates.
Table 6: Regression Results for Domestic Flights
Full Sample CEM
VARIABLES Only FE Base Model Extended Model Only FE Base Model Extended Model
Congestion charge -0.149 0.257 0.355 0.314 0.289 0.249*
(0.504) (0.157) (0.198) (0.148) (0.138) (0.0962)
GDP 0.000280* 0.000272** 5.40e-05 5.12e-05
(0.000112) (1.00e-04) (5.20e-05) (5.02e-05)
Air Fare Index -0.0293 -0.0274 -0.00333 -0.00616
(0.0303) (0.0307) (0.00813) (0.00729)
Tourism -0.000911 -0.000981 -0.000412 -0.000335
(0.000808) (0.000822) (0.000315) (0.000291)
Rail Fare Index 0.0205 -0.0120
(0.0337) (0.00964)
Road Fare Index -0.0612 0.0206
(0.0520) (0.0257)
Constant 2.856*** -2.339 0.454 1.899*** 1.132 0.754
(0.0239) (2.085) (6.155) (0.0273) (0.722) (2.088)
Observations 87 67 67 57 44 44
R-squared 0.299 0.523 0.527 0.430 0.765 0.773
Number of entity 6 6 6 4 4 4
Entity FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-squared 0.114 0.358 0.336 0.160 0.611 0.592
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The results of the regression of domestic flights on the treatment dummy are depicted
in table 6. The signs of the estimates are the same as in the main regression, but most
of the estimates are stronger or more positive, respectively. Only the estimate from the
extended model on the full sample becomes slightly weaker. Except for the specifications
in column 1 and 4, the standard errors are lower than in the first results table. As above,
the standard errors are lower for the CEM sample, implying more stable estimates. The
estimates are not only larger in magnitude overall, but one of them also becomes slightly
significant (on the 10% level). This is the extended model CEM sample estimate, which
should provide the best fit. As mentioned earlier in the context of the fixed effects model,
the standard errors are likely to be biased and lead to over-confident results. So while
again no causal relationship is reliably supported, the larger estimates are in line with the
reasoning for this extension.
5.2.3 Holiday Season
Linking back to the original idea of the study, which was that people take a decision
about short-distance travel modes and afterwards they choose if and how to travel a
further distance, the importance of having a choice is obvious. It is crucial that people
are enabled to make a decision for the conceptual framework to hold. It is reasonable to
assume that everybody is freer in making decisions about their leisure trips than about
business trips. Hence this extension focusses on the main holiday seasons only, where the
share of holiday trips should be comparatively high.
Table 7: Regression Results for Summer Season
Full Sample CEM
VARIABLES Only FE Base Model Extended Model Only FE Base Model Extended Model
Congestion charge -0.0191 -0.00145 0.0201 -0.000921 0.00295 0.00205
(0.0227) (0.0132) (0.0197) (0.00861) (0.00377) (0.00233)
GDP 3.32e-06 1.66e-06 5.42e-07 4.16e-07
(2.20e-06) (2.68e-06) (1.01e-06) (1.02e-06)
Air Fare Index -0.000280 0.000711* 4.33e-05 -1.43e-05
(0.000877) (0.000304) (0.000230) (0.000190)
Tourism -4.83e-05 -6.27e-05 8.86e-06 1.33e-05
(5.87e-05) (5.99e-05) (7.61e-06) (6.68e-06)
Rail Fare Index 0.00500 -0.000269
(0.00349) (0.000510)
Road Fare Index -0.00554 0.00114
(0.00327) (0.000702)
Constant 0.145*** 0.237 0.212 0.116*** 0.0482** -0.0201
(0.00319) (0.241) (0.312) (0.00215) (0.00830) (0.0959)
Observations 78 60 60 52 41 41
R-squared 0.243 0.234 0.326 0.639 0.751 0.761
Number of entity 6 6 6 4 4 4
Entity FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-squared 0.0446 -0.0516 0.0294 0.474 0.617 0.602
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Tables 7 and 8 present the results for the two different main seasons: summer and winter.
The dependent variable for the summer is the monthly average flight number between June
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and August, while the winter variable measures the average flight numbers of December
and January12. These average values are then regressed on the congestion charge dummy
again.
For both, the summer and winter season, the signs change somewhat. For the summer
set, both fixed-effects-only estimates as well as the full sample base model estimate are
negative. For the winter regressions even the estimate of the base specification in the CEM
sample becomes negative. Overall the signs of these results are really mixed and none of
the estimates is significant.
Another interesting issue is the magnitude of the effects. At first glance the effects seem
much smaller than in the previous regressions. That is because the estimates have a
different interpretation. While the a .01 estimate in the first regression would indicate
an increase of the yearly number of flight trips per capita by .01, it would indicate the
same increase, but for each month in the holiday dataset. Hence, if the effects were to be
exactly the same, all holiday estimates should be one twelfth of their counter estimate in
the first regressions. Comparing the estimates closely, this is roughly the case for only few
of the regressions.
Table 8: Regression Results for Winter Season
Full Sample CEM
VARIABLES Only FE Base Model Extended Model Only FE Base Model Extended Model
Congestion charge -0.0194 -0.00994 0.00446 -0.00739 -0.000784 -0.00211
(0.0180) (0.0146) (0.00695) (0.0112) (0.00855) (0.00850)
GDP -1.25e-06 -2.58e-06 8.02e-07 7.19e-07
(2.12e-06) (4.10e-06) (2.86e-06) (2.81e-06)
Air Fare Index -0.000144 0.000375 -0.000365 -0.000459
(0.000745) (0.000939) (0.000696) (0.000471)
Tourism 6.91e-06 -5.19e-06 4.51e-06 6.73e-06
(1.06e-05) (6.64e-06) (1.56e-05) (1.15e-05)
Rail Fare Index 0.00309 -0.000397
(0.00243) (0.00106)
Road Fare Index -0.00526 0.000601
(0.00291) (0.00237)
Constant 0.323*** 0.232** 0.370* 0.264*** 0.251** 0.244
(0.00267) (0.0785) (0.146) (0.00285) (0.0697) (0.259)
Observations 77 60 60 51 41 41
R-squared 0.494 0.645 0.707 0.698 0.700 0.701
Number of entity 6 6 6 4 4 4
Entity FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-squared 0.369 0.514 0.579 0.569 0.538 0.501
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Most of the estimates for the summer season are relatively smaller than the main estimates.
This would imply that the spillover effect on flights was smaller during the summer months
and is contrary to the expectations formulated before. The expectation is that the share
of leisure passengers is higher during summer. However, this might not necessarily hold
for the short-haul flights considered in this study. The estimates for the winter season are
12The December value is always paired with the January value of the following year. So this is the
average value for one season, rather than one year.
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extremely heterogeneous and most estimates even have different signs compared to the
main regression. Overall there does not seem to be a consistent deviation in the holiday
estimates from the main set of regressions. What is interesting though is that there are
more negative signs among the holiday estimates. In general, this would rather imply
promoting spillover effects. However, none of the estimates is significant, so again it is not
plausible to draw any causal inference.
5.2.4 Discarding Gothenburg
As motivated earlier, it is valid to discard Gothenburg for one further extension. Origi-
nally unloved in both cities, the attitude of the citizens of Stockholm towards congestion
charging has considerably changed from the start of the trial phase and even before it was
decided what was going to be done with the revenues. The people recognize the environ-
mental impact of the charge, while the citizens of Gothenburg see the charging primarily
as a financing instrument. Even though they comply as well, it is far less likely that the
people of Gothenburg pat themselves on the back for pro-environmental action. Hence
behavioral spillover effects should be more likely in Stockholm.
Table 9: Main Regression Results without Gothenburg
Full Sample CEM
VARIABLES Only FE Base Model Extended Model Only FE Base Model Extended Model
Congestion charge -0.105 -0.000527 0.734* 0.656*** 0.63413 0.549***
(0.616) (0.477) (0.277) (6.57e-08) (5.18e-06)
GDP 3.25e-05 2.49e-05 5.85e-05 3.86e-05***
(2.88e-05) (4.91e-05) (5.34e-10)
Air Fare Index 0.00520 0.0135 -0.00640 -0.00612***
(0.0132) (0.0120) (2.02e-07)
Tourism -0.000204 -0.000740 0.000339 0.000661***
(0.000377) (0.000447) (3.98e-08)
Rail Fare Index 0.0836 -0.00382***
(0.0562) (5.42e-07)
Road Fare Index -0.111 0.0482***
(0.0594) (2.90e-06)
Constant 2.948*** 3.171 5.313 1.635*** 1.264** -2.349***
(0.0519) (1.905) (2.971) (1.95e-07) (0.0377) (0.0248)
Observations 69 50 50 31 20 20
R-squared 0.562 0.509 0.655 0.978 0.974 0.979
Number of entity 5 5 5 2 2 2
Entity FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-squared 0.393 0.270 0.454 0.941 0.916 0.901
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 9 displays the main regression results when Stockholm is used as the only treated
unit. I.e. in the full sample regression the per capita number of flights from/to Stockholm
is compared with the control group average14 and the CEM sample only includes the direct
comparison of Stockholm and Helsinki. While the first two specifications result in slightly
negative, yet insignificant estimates, the extended full sample model and the three CEM
sample specifications yield rather high positive estimates. An increase in flight numbers
13No standard errors have been generated by STATA here. This might be due to the small sample size.
14Gothenburg is not included in the control group, but discarded completely from the sample.
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Table 10: Regression Results for Domestic Flights without Gothenburg
Full Sample CEM
VARIABLES Only FE Base Model Extended Model Only FE Base Model Extended Model
Congestion charge -0.171 -0.0922 0.116 0.493*** 0.465*** 0.421***
(0.553) (0.495) (0.296) (2.41e-08) (3.58e-06) (8.85e-06)
GDP 0.000166* 0.000170* 3.22e-05*** 1.78e-05***
(7.03e-05) (6.29e-05) (7.62e-10) (9.12e-10)
Air Fare Index -0.0174 -0.0141 -0.00433*** -0.00303***
(0.0201) (0.0197) (8.11e-09) (3.44e-07)
Tourism 0.000177 6.16e-05 0.000291*** 0.000573***
(0.000499) (0.000368) (1.51e-08) (6.79e-08)
Rail Fare Index 0.0276 0.00200***
(0.0501) (9.26e-07)
Road Fare Index -0.0259 0.0352***
(0.0434) (4.96e-06)
Constant 3.248*** -5.506 -5.854 2.588*** 0.739** -2.584***
(0.0201) (3.589) (6.097) (6.96e-08) (0.0317) (0.0188)
Observations 72 54 54 30 20 20
R-squared 0.341 0.622 0.624 0.949 0.966 0.973
Number of entity 5 5 5 2 2 2
Entity FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-squared 0.117 0.443 0.414 0.865 0.894 0.870
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
by 0.549 per year as the estimate in the last column suggests for instance, is equivalent to
almost 12% of the average yearly number of flight trips15.
The full sample estimate is significant on the 10% level and almost twice as large as the
original estimate, which included Gothenburg. Two of the CEM estimates, from the model
with only fixed effects and the extended model, are even significant on the 1% level. Those
estimates are much larger in magnitude than the original estimates as well. Although the
standard error problem that weakens the confidence of our results should still be kept in
mind, this is an interesting turn.
Running the same extensions as before without Gothenburg results in further significant
estimates. Tables 10 and 11 show the results for domestic flights and for the summer hol-
iday season. The results for the winter season mostly stay insignificant, but are displayed
in appendix G.
The estimates for domestic flights have the same signs as in the main regression. They
are overall a bit lower, but the standard errors are similar. Again, standard errors are
much smaller for the CEM sample. The estimates for domestic flights are insignificant for
all specifications in the full sample, but significant on the 1% level in the CEM sample.
Again, it would be wrong to jump to any conclusions, because the “true” significance level
is most likely lower. The regressions for the summer season without Gothenburg have
similar signs as when the full set of cities is used. The CEM estimates become significant
when additional control variables are used. When the estimates are compared to the main
estimates now, they all point into the same directions at least. The relative magnitudes
are quite mixed, but the two significant estimates are relatively smaller than the effects
in the main regression. This is in line with the summer season results for the all cities,
15Compared to the average of the control group and Stockholm in 2005. The exact number is 11.98%.
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Table 11: Regression Results for Summer Season without Gothenburg
Full Sample CEM
VARIABLES Only FE Base Model Extended Model Only FE Base Model Extended Model
Congestion charge -0.0276 -0.00751 0.0423 0.0174 0.00733*** 0.00252***
(0.0433) (0.0264) (0.0423) (1.26e-07) (1.02e-06)
GDP 3.74e-06 3.54e-06* -3.73e-07*** -8.08e-07***
(2.06e-06) (1.48e-06) (0) (1.05e-10)
Air Fare Index -1.16e-05 0.000695 0.000100*** -7.76e-05***
(0.00110) (0.000625) (2.86e-10) (3.95e-08)
Tourism -4.89e-05 -8.38e-05 2.27e-05*** 2.15e-05***
(5.76e-05) (7.68e-05) (5.34e-10) (7.79e-09)
Rail Fare Index 0.00597 -0.000875***
(0.00450) (1.06e-07)
Road Fare Index -0.00611 0.000989***
(0.00390) (5.69e-07)
Constant 0.165*** 0.201 0.201 0.117 0.0412*** 0.0808***
(0.00600) (0.213) (0.304) (0.000194) (0.000290)
Observations 66 50 50 28 20 20
R-squared 0.282 0.272 0.365 0.852 0.953 0.979
Number of entity 5 5 5 2 2 2
Entity FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-squared 0.0480 -0.0804 -0.00417 0.637 0.851 0.899
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
which suggested a lower effect during the summer season.
To look closer at the potential effects of the policy in Gothenburg, the same analysis has
been performed discarding Stockholm. The results from the main regression are presented
in appendix H. While these estimates mainly point towards a negative relationship and
thus explain the weaker results when both, Stockholm and Gothenburg are included, the
estimates from the crucial specifications are insignificant.
5.3 Interpretation
5.3.1 Insights Gained From the Results
Although some of the extensions yield significant results, no certain conclusions can be
drawn with respect to a causal effect on the outcome variable and certainly not with re-
spect to the research question. However, there are some interesting tendencies within the
various estimates which can be seen as eventual points of departure for further analysis.
Overall most of the estimates point towards a positive relationship between congestion
charging and the number of flight trips. Most of the tested extensions (peak charge, do-
mestic fights and using Stockholm only) support this finding. The domestic flights seem
to be more responsive to the charge introduction, which is in line with the theory. There
are most likely more substitutes available when the travel distance is shorter. The results
that can be seen when Gothenburg is excluded from the sample also align with earlier
expectations. The estimates for Stockholm alone are stronger in magnitude and show a
higher statistical significance. This might speak in favor of behavioral shifts, because the
income effects are probably similar for both cities.
Every significant estimate in the regressions has a positive sign. The significance and
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magnitude of these estimates is increasing for some cases where one would expect stronger
spillover effects: for shorter distances and when excluding Stockholm. Against the ex-
pectations this effect is not clearly visible during holiday seasons. If one wanted to trust
the estimates, they would suggest that congestion charging lead to gross substitution be-
tween car use and air travel, at least in Stockholm. This indicates potential for permitting
spillover effects, such as moral licensing.
The results obtained here are in line with findings by Gneezy et al., Pittman and Zanna
& Copper mentioned in the literature reviwe, who find that permitting effects are more
likely if the perceived cost of behavior 1 is low and that promoting spillovers are less likely,
if behavioral changes are related to an external cause.
5.3.2 Limitations to the Results
Various problems have been encountered throughout this study that need to make us
careful about the interpretation of the results. First of all the significance levels displayed
in the regression outputs are most likely overly confident, due to the small sample size.
Thus even the significant results need to be handled with care. The estimates with very
high significance levels might still be seen as revealing a trend. For future studies with
small sample size it would be desirable to test another type of standard errors, like wild
cluster bootstrapped errors for example.
Another problem mentioned earlier is potential simultaneity bias. It arises because the
number of flight trips is very likely not only an outcome of congestion charging, but at
the same time an underlying driver for the policy. Having more data, in particular a
panel with more time periods can contribute to a solution for this problem, as lagged
variables could be used. Another option would be the use of an instrumental variable or
a randomized controlled experiment. Here matching was used to achieve a situation as
close to randomization as possible.
Furthermore, bias due to omitted variables could be an issue. While the matching allows
to include more control variables than would have been possible by only using the fixed
effects model, it was not possible to control for political constellations and infrastructure
investments for example. Future studies, which might compare cities on a national level
might be able to include at least a political control variable to tackle potential OVB.
This problem is likely to leave us with some endogeneity in the introduction of the policy.
Fortunately endogeneity in the case of the present study would rather explain promoting
than permitting spillover effects, because the implementation of congestion charging should
be more consistent with a reduction in flight trips within one city. As the obtained results
suggest permitting spillover effects, the true estimates might be even larger, if endogeneity
is eliminated.
There is one more major point of criticism that might be brought forward with regard to
this study. That is the fact that only a fraction of the observed passengers are actually
affected by the congestion charge policy. That said, the people who are most affected by the
congestion charges can on average be expected to own a car and to have an employment.
Two characteristics which are likely to be correlated with demand for more (frequent) air
travel. Thus their share among the passengers might actually be relatively high, though
this cannot be proved here. Second, as mentioned earlier, even those people who do not
adapt their behavior receive a signal about their commuting behavior, which might in turn
lead to spillover effects.
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6 Conclusions
This study has made a first approach to look for evidence for behavioral spillover effects
related to travel mode choices by investigating the relationship between congestion charg-
ing and the demand for short-haul flight demand.
To answer the research question a literature review about the effects of congestion charging
on local travel behavior in Stockholm and Gothenburg is conducted, leading to fulfillment
of sub goal (a) of this study. Namely that the introduction of the policy has led to sudden
shifts towards more environmentally friendly travel modes; mainly public transportation.
In search for causal inference (sub goal (b)), the yearly number of per capita flight trips
is regressed on a treatment dummy using a difference-in-differences setting. The use of
matching techniques, in particular coarsened exact matching, allows to control for further
variables, which were impossible to control for in the fixed effects model. Matching thus
adds to the study by reaching a higher balance between the treatment and the control
group.
While the results do not enable to draw any certain conclusions about a causal relation-
ship between congestion charging and the demand for short-haul air travel, the estimates
mainly point towards a gross substitution between car usage and air travel. These findings
are supported by most of the model extensions (Sub goal (c)). Particularly by using the
peak charge as an alternative independent variable, using only domestic flights or Stock-
holm as the only treated unit. Extensions focusing on the holiday season lead to rather
mixed and mainly insignificant results.
These findings make promoting spillover effects, which would yield decreases in air travel
following reductions in car travel, seem highly unlikely. If there was to be any behavioral
spillover effect, the estimates rather point towards a permitting effect. The most reliable
estimate, obtained when excluding Gothenburg, suggests an increase of yearly flight trips
by almost 12% following the implementation of a congestion charge in Stockholm.
A huge black hole is gaping in the literature on behavioral spillover effects in travel mode
decisions and hence there is rich potential for future research. Spillover effects should be
studied in different contexts, e.g. in other countries, under alternative policy scenarios or
including more cities. With respect to the present study it would be desirable to exploit
corresponding micro data with similar methods. While recent studies have shown that
travel mode choices are often contradictory (in particular air travel), survey studies need
to be complemented with empirical evidence. Furthermore, it would be interesting to dis-
entangle the income and substitution effects triggered by the congestion charge in order
to separate behavioral effects more clearly.
If in fact there are unrecognized behavioral forces at work, this would have major impli-
cations for the net changes in emissions caused by congestion charging and thus for policy
making. Due to the increasing relative contribution of the travel sector to global GHG
emissions, further studies should be carried out in order to obtain clarity about all the
effects that pollution reduction policies trigger. Otherwise most of these policies could
wind up being at most a drop in the ocean.
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Appendices
A Income and Substitution Effects
The total changes in demand depend on the magnitude of income and substitution effects.
The higher price for car travel will lower people’s purchasing power and should thus
decrease the demand for both, car and air travel (income effect). It rotates the budget
line from AB to AD. On the other hand flying will become cheaper relative to car usage
(represented by the increased slope of the budget line), which would argue for increases
in the demand for air travel (substitution effect). In this exemplary graph, the demnad
for both goods would decrease from C to E. The budget line FJ represents a partial
income compensation, which does not explicitly happen in the case of this study. However,
one might argue that the improvements in public transportation might be such a partial
compensation for example. From that point of view, the new consumption point H would
represent an increase in demand for air travel. A change in preferences (represented by
the pink indifference curves) could easily lead to an increase in air travel as compared to
C as well.
Source: Pindyck & Rubinfeld (2009). This is a variation of their graph on page 124.
B Carried and On Board Passenger Numbers
This graph shows the number of yearly flight trips per capita for each city separately.
The solid lines represent carried passenger flights, the dashed lines on board passenger
numbers. While the lines for each city mostly move smoothly together, there are some
exceptions. Copenhagen for instance has not reported any close international flights in
2000 and no national flights in 1998, 1999 and 2000. “Reliable” on board numbers are
available from around 2001, which adds three pre-treatment years for Stockholm to the
trend graph.
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C Difference-In-Differences Design
As the name suggests, DID includes two types of differences. First the differences in the
outcome variable of interest before and after the treatment for the treated and the control
group is calculated. Secondly those two differences are subtracted from each other.
Source: Stock & Watson [42], page 492.
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D Connections for Close International Flights
City, Airport Destination
Stockholm, Arlanda Berlin, Hamburg, Copenhagen, Tallinn, Helsinki, Tampere,
Turku, Vaasa, Riga, Bergen, Statfjord, Oslo
Stockholm, Skavsta Berlin, Bremen, Lu¨beck, Copenhagen, Tallinn, Riga
Stockholm, Bromma Copenhagen, Tallinn, Helsinki
Gothenburg, Landvetter Hamburg, Berlin, Copenhagen, Helsinki, Statfjord, Oslo
Gothenburg, Sa¨ve Berlin
Gothenburg, Jonko¨ping Copenhagen
Malmo¨ Amsterdam, Gdansk
Copenhagen, Kastrup Brussels, Berlin, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Ko¨ln, Du¨sseldorf,
Hannover, Helsinki, Amsterdam, Bergen, Kristiansand,
Statfjord, Oslo, Sandefjord, Trondheim, Stavanger, Go¨teborg,
Jonko¨ping, Stockholm, Norrko¨ping, Karlstad
Helsinki, Vantaa Copenhagen, Statfjord, Oslo, Go¨teborg, Stockholm
Oslo, Gardermoen Billund, Copenhagen, Go¨teborg, Stockholm
Oslo, Sandefjord Copenhagen, Stockholm
Oslo, Moss Aarhus
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E All Potential Control Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Carried Passengers Carried Passengers Carried Passengers Carried Passengers Carried Passengers
Congestion charge -0.203 0.0585 0.0585 0.389 0.345
(0.377) (0.208) (0.208) (0.229) (0.220)
GDP 3.78e-05 3.78e-05 1.01e-05 0.000107*
(2.77e-05) (2.77e-05) (4.95e-05) (4.75e-05)
Air Fare Index 0.00146 0.00146 0.0153 0.0122*
(0.00893) (0.00893) (0.0105) (0.00518)
Tourism -0.000210 -0.000210 -0.000457 -0.000664
(0.000387) (0.000387) (0.000384) (0.000577)
Road Fare Index -0.101 -0.133
(0.0508) (0.0672)
Rail Fare Index 0.0743 0.0618*
(0.0490) (0.0306)
Unemployment Rate 0.00122
(0.0552)
Green Party Share -0.00558
(0.0247)
Constant 2.361*** 2.905 2.905 4.085 5.604
(0.0322) (1.541) (1.541) (2.842) (4.315)
Observations 81 60 60 60 57
R-squared 0.532 0.460 0.460 0.621 0.719
Number of entity 6 6 6 6 6
Entity FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-squared 0.386 0.260 0.260 0.454 0.562
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
F Regression Results with Peak Charge
Full Sample CEM
VARIABLES Only FE Base Model Extended Model Only FE Base Model Extended Model
Peak Charge -0.0102 0.00339 0.0212 0.00327 0.0108 0.0106
(0.0191) (0.0112) (0.0117) (0.0134) (0.00800) (0.00499)
GDP 3.78e-05 9.69e-06 2.59e-05 2.37e-05
(2.77e-05) (4.96e-05) (3.56e-05) (3.81e-05)
Air Fare Index 0.00137 0.0150 9.06e-05 6.77e-05
(0.00895) (0.0104) (0.00828) (0.00868)
Tourism -0.000214 -0.000473 0.000196 0.000282
(0.000385) (0.000388) (0.000312) (0.000265)
Rail Fare Index 0.0750 -0.000960
(0.0489) (0.0166)
Road Fare Index -0.102* 0.0218
(0.0505) (0.0259)
Constant 2.360*** 2.927 4.227 1.512*** 1.830* 0.0360
(0.0326) (1.551) (2.801) (0.0630) (0.585) (1.768)
Observations 81 60 60 55 41 41
R-squared 0.532 0.460 0.623 0.853 0.753 0.756
Number of entity 6 6 6 4 4 4
Entity FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-squared 0.386 0.260 0.457 0.773 0.620 0.593
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
G Regression Results for Winter Season without Gothen-
burg
Full Sample CEM
VARIABLES Only FE Base Model Extended Model Only FE Base Model Extended Model
Congestion charge -0.0248 -0.0238 0.00742 0.0186 0.00891 0.0185
(0.0292) (0.0323) (0.0104)
GDP -2.13e-06 -2.60e-06 1.65e-06 1.41e-06
(3.50e-06) (4.93e-06)
Air Fare Index 0.000173 0.000461 -0.000673 -1.27e-05
(0.00105) (0.00105)
Tourism 1.48e-05 -8.61e-06 9.82e-05 0.000131
(2.67e-05) (1.69e-05)
Rail Fare Index 0.00341 0.00278
(0.00247)
Road Fare Index -0.00536 0.000790
(0.00327)
Constant 0.372*** 0.247 0.406* 0.291 -0.0251* -0.490***
(0.00197) (0.131) (0.180) (0.00288) (0.000996)
Observations 65 50 50 27 20 20
R-squared 0.521 0.687 0.740 0.906 0.950 0.972
Number of entity 5 5 5 2 2 2
Entity FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-squared 0.374 0.535 0.589 0.779 0.841 0.867
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
H Main Regression Results without Stockholm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Only FE Base Model Extended Model Only FE Base Model Extended Model
Congestion charge -0.359 -0.0291 0.135 -0.375*** -0.213 -0.0478
(0.327) (0.0868) (0.219) (1.76e-09)
GDP 4.27e-05 -9.26e-06 -0.000122 -9.89e-05
(3.50e-05) (6.18e-05)
Air Fare Index 0.00510 0.0153 -0.0241 -0.0167
(0.0107) (0.00817)
Tourism -0.000150 -0.000651 0.000601 0.000692
(0.000441) (0.000534)
Rail Fare Index 0.0873 0.0197
(0.0509)
Road Fare Index -0.154* 0.0142
(0.0582)
Constant 2.211*** 1.993 7.800 2.986* 6.395** 1.833*
(0.0364) (2.055) (4.044) (0.269) (0.233) (0.198)
Observations 69 50 50 24 21 21
R-squared 0.515 0.423 0.666 0.797 0.937 0.967
Number of entity 5 5 5 2 2 2
Entity FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-squared 0.327 0.143 0.472 0.577 0.789 0.833
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
34
References
[1] Dolores Albarracin and Robert S Wyer Jr. The cognitive impact of past behavior:
influences on beliefs, attitudes, and future behavioral decisions. Journal of personality
and social psychology, 79(1):5, 2000.
[2] David Andersson and Jonas Na¨sse´n. The gothenburg congestion charge scheme: A
pre–post analysis of commuting behavior and travel satisfaction. Journal of Transport
Geography, 52:82–89, 2016.
[3] James Andreoni. Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of warm-
glow giving. The economic journal, 100(401):464–477, 1990.
[4] Daryl J Bem. Self-perception theory. Advances in experimental social psychology,
6:1–62, 1972.
[5] Irene Blanken, Niels van de Ven, and Marcel Zeelenberg. A meta-analytic review of
moral licensing. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41(4):540–558, 2015.
[6] Maria Bo¨rjesson, Jonas Eliasson, Muriel B Hugosson, and Karin Brundell-Freij. The
stockholm congestion charges—5 years on. effects, acceptability and lessons learnt.
Transport Policy, 20:1–12, 2012.
[7] Maria Bo¨rjesson and Ida Kristoffersson. The gothenburg congestion charge. effects,
design and politics. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 75:134–146,
2015.
[8] Martijn Brons, Eric Pels, Peter Nijkamp, and Piet Rietveld. Price elasticities of de-
mand for passenger air travel: a meta-analysis. Journal of Air Transport Management,
8(3):165–175, 2002.
[9] Colin Camerer. Behavioral economics: Reunifying psychology and economics. Pro-
ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 96(19):10575–10577, 1999.
[10] A Colin Cameron, Jonah B Gelbach, and Douglas L Miller. Bootstrap-based improve-
ments for inference with clustered errors. The Review of Economics and Statistics,
90(3):414–427, 2008.
[11] Jessica Cascio and E Ashby Plant. Prospective moral licensing: Does anticipating
doing good later allow you to be bad now? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
56:110–116, 2015.
[12] Scott A Cohen, James ES Higham, and Christina T Cavaliere. Binge flying: Be-
havioural addiction and climate change. Annals of Tourism Research, 38(3):1070–
1089, 2011.
[13] Ravi Dhar and Itamar Simonson. Making complementary choices in consumption
episodes: Highlighting versus balancing. Journal of Marketing Research, pages 29–
44, 1999.
[14] Andreas Diekmann and Peter Preisendo¨rfer. Green and greenback the behavioral
effects of environmental attitudes in low-cost and high-cost situations. Rationality
and Society, 15(4):441–472, 2003.
35
[15] Soumyananda Dinda. Environmental kuznets curve hypothesis: a survey. Ecological
economics, 49(4):431–455, 2004.
[16] Paul Dolan and Matteo M Galizzi. Like ripples on a pond: behavioral spillovers and
their implications for research and policy. Journal of Economic Psychology, 47:1–16,
2015.
[17] Paul Dolan, Michael Hallsworth, David Halpern, Dominic King, Robert Metcalfe,
and Ivo Vlaev. Influencing behaviour: The mindspace way. Journal of Economic
Psychology, 33(1):264–277, 2012.
[18] Claes Ek. Behavioral spillovers across prosocial alternatives. 2016.
[19] Jonas Eliasson, Lars Hultkrantz, Lena Nerhagen, and Lena Smidfelt Rosqvist. The
stockholm congestion–charging trial 2006: Overview of effects. Transportation Re-
search Part A: Policy and Practice, 43(3):240–250, 2009.
[20] Jonathan L Freedman and Scott C Fraser. Compliance without pressure: the foot-
in-the-door technique. Journal of personality and social psychology, 4(2):195, 1966.
[21] Ayelet Gneezy, Uri Gneezy, Gerhard Riener, and Leif D Nelson. Pay-what-you-
want, identity, and self-signaling in markets. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 109(19):7236–7240, 2012.
[22] Mark Goh. Congestion management and electronic road pricing in singapore. Journal
of Transport Geography, 10(1):29–38, 2002.
[23] Hugh Gravelle and Ray Rees. Microeconomics. 3: e uppl. Harlow: Prentice Hall,
2004.
[24] Julia F Hibbert, Janet E Dickinson, Stefan Go¨ssling, and Susanna Curtin. Identity
and tourism mobility: an exploration of the attitude–behaviour gap. Journal of
Sustainable Tourism, 21(7):999–1016, 2013.
[25] Daniel E Ho, Kosuke Imai, Gary King, and Elizabeth A Stuart. Matching as nonpara-
metric preprocessing for reducing model dependence in parametric causal inference.
Political analysis, 15(3):199–236, 2007.
[26] Stefano M Iacus, Gary King, and Giuseppe Porro. Multivariate matching methods
that are monotonic imbalance bounding. Journal of the American Statistical Associ-
ation, 106(493):345–361, 2011.
[27] Stefano M Iacus, Gary King, Giuseppe Porro, and Jonathan N Katz. Causal inference
without balance checking: Coarsened exact matching. Political analysis, pages 1–24,
2012.
[28] Petros Ieromonachou, Stephen Potter, and James P Warren. Norway’s urban toll
rings: Evolving towards congestion charging? Transport Policy, 13(5):367–378, 2006.
[29] Alex Imas. Working for the ”warm glow”: On the benefits and limits of prosocial
incentives. Journal of Public Economics, 114:14–18, 2014.
[30] Grant D Jacobsen, Matthew J Kotchen, and Michael P Vandenbergh. The behavioral
response to voluntary provision of an environmental public good: Evidence from
residential electricity demand. European Economic Review, 56(5):946–960, 2012.
36
[31] Veronika Job, Carol S Dweck, and Gregory M Walton. Ego depletion—is it all in your
head? implicit theories about willpower affect self-regulation. Psychological science,
2010.
[32] Jonathan Leape. The london congestion charge. The Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, 20(4):157–176, 2006.
[33] Bob McKercher, Bruce Prideaux, Catherine Cheung, and Rob Law. Achieving vol-
untary reductions in the carbon footprint of tourism and climate change. Journal of
sustainable tourism, 18(3):297–317, 2010.
[34] James J Murphy, P Geoffrey Allen, Thomas H Stevens, and Darryl Weatherhead. A
meta-analysis of hypothetical bias in stated preference valuation. Environmental and
Resource Economics, 30(3):313–325, 2005.
[35] Andreas Nilsson, Magnus Bergquist, and Wesley P Schultz. Spillover effects in envi-
ronmental behaviors, across time and context: a review and research agenda. Envi-
ronmental Education Research, 23(4):573–589, 2017.
[36] RS Pindyck, DL Rubinfeld, Paul G Farnham, David Miles, Andrew Scott, and Francis
Breedon. Microeconomics, 7th. edi—tion, 2009.
[37] Thane S Pittman. Attribution of arousal as a mediator in dissonance reduction.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 11(1):53–63, 1975.
[38] Lucia Rotaris, Romeo Danielis, Edoardo Marcucci, and Je´roˆme Massiani. The urban
road pricing scheme to curb pollution in milan, italy: Description, impacts and pre-
liminary cost–benefit analysis assessment. Transportation Research Part A: Policy
and Practice, 44(5):359–375, 2010.
[39] Sgouris Sgouridis, Philippe A Bonnefoy, and R John Hansman. Air transportation
in a carbon constrained world: Long-term dynamics of policies and strategies for
mitigating the carbon footprint of commercial aviation. Transportation Research
Part A: Policy and Practice, 45(10):1077–1091, 2011.
[40] Jason F Shogren and Laura O Taylor. On behavioral-environmental economics. Re-
view of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2(1):26–44, 2008.
[41] Steve Sorrell. Jevons’ paradox revisited: The evidence for backfire from improved
energy efficiency. Energy policy, 37(4):1456–1469, 2009.
[42] James H Stock and Mark W Watson. Introduction to econometrics, volume 104.
Addison Wesley Boston, 2003.
[43] Cass R Sunstein. Empirically informed regulation. The University of Chicago Law
Review, 78(4):1349–1429, 2011.
[44] Verena Tiefenbeck, Thorsten Staake, Kurt Roth, and Olga Sachs. For better or for
worse? empirical evidence of moral licensing in a behavioral energy conservation
campaign. Energy Policy, 57:160–171, 2013.
[45] Heather Barnes Truelove, Amanda R Carrico, Elke U Weber, Kaitlin Toner Raimi,
and Michael P Vandenbergh. Positive and negative spillover of pro-environmental
behavior: An integrative review and theoretical framework. Global Environmental
Change, 29:127–138, 2014.
37
[46] Lorraine Whitmarsh and Saffron O’Neill. Green identity, green living? the role
of pro-environmental self-identity in determining consistency across diverse pro-
environmental behaviours. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 30(3):305–314,
2010.
[47] Mark P Zanna and Joel Cooper. Dissonance and the pill: an attribution approach
to studying the arousal properties of dissonance. Journal of personality and social
psychology, 29(5):703, 1974.
[48] Chen-Bo Zhong and Katie Liljenquist. Washing away your sins: Threatened morality
and physical cleansing. Science, 313(5792):1451–1452, 2006.
38
